GreeNTD Food for Thought: On the Other and Alterity - A philosophical insight

Technical Meeting on

Negotiation Environment and Territorial Development

Green NEGOTIATED TERRITORIAL DEVELOPMENT (GreeNTD)

FAO-HQs Rome, 9-10 September 2015 – Ethiopia Room

FOOD FOR THOUGHT

On the Other and Alterity

A philosophical insight

Margherita Brunori

Etre deux

The question of the other – writes Luce Irigaray, speaking about gender- has been poorly formulated in the Western tradition, for the other is always seen as the other of the same, the other of the subject itself, rather than another subject irreducible to the masculine subject and sharing equivalent dignity.

In the traditional process of the discovery of the self, the self is engaged with its negative in a dialectical operation. The operation of the negative should instead engage in two subjects, in order not to reduce the two to the one, the other to the same. Through this gesture, the subject gives up being one and singular. It respects the other, the two, in an intersubjective relation. Another subject that is two but is not second.

In Irigaray’s opinion, succeeding in the revolutionary move of affirming the self as other and valorising the difference is a gesture that allows us to promote the recognition of all forms of others without hierarchy, privilege, or authority over them: whether it be differences in race, age, culture, religion.

Alterity

Talking in more general terms, nowadays the question of alterity is gaining an increasing importance. The complex processes of social and cultural change make momentum for a new look on the issue of the other. Following those changes, the differences (be it cultural, of values, or experiences) penetrates in everyone’s daily life and the problem of alterity emerges with all its anthropological, historical and political implications.

Due to the current mutations, traditional categories are increasingly unapt for the comprehension of reality to the point that it is no longer possible to think to alterity as something that is external or counterposed to identity. Indeed, the other is no longer collocated in a remote, delimited and circumscribed space, above the boundaries of the individual or collective self, but it is increasingly near.

The dialogue, or the “polilogue”

According to Gadamer, in order to understand the alterity, it is necessary to perceive it as within a relation, and not as an absolute and isolated object of knowledge. It should be a dialogue based on the exchange of questions and answers that does not aim at reaching a unilateral point of view, but rather an agreement on the issue.

To comprehend the alterity means to provoke a “fusion of horizons” because the truth is not monological but dialogical, it does not unveil a pre-existing situation, but it is the result of the common understanding and interpreting.

Pushing the dialogical element further, Franz Martin Wimmer talks about the polilogue. Opposed to the monologue and recognizing the plural essence of the other, the polilogue is a model in which everyone is constantly willing to call his/her own concepts into question. The dialogical, or polilogical, model do not presuppose an absolute truth already found by someone: its task is to activate processes; it is the dialogue that produces reality.

Being two in a dialogue

The temptation to resolve the pluralism -rising in the attempt to comprehend alterity- should be highlighted and avoided; the attempt to integrate or reduce differences should be contrasted. This commitment should begin from the acknowledgement that the other is irreducible to the personal pre-concepts: it should remain visible in its diversity. The goal of the imperative of understanding the other should never be assimilation nor the exclusion. Rather, it is an endless task in which the other appears essentially as the other.

Conclusions

Trying to summarize what previously said, some points are highlighted:

·         The other is an irreducible other worth of same dignity.

·         There are many others, according to the concrete context and situation; the other is plural, and near.

·         The other is originally perceived through a relation, and in the dialogical (or polilogical) relation the otherness should be recognized and valorised.

Only within the dialogue the relation can evolve from a sharing of living spaces, to a sharing of projects that are finalized to organize those spaces.

Bibliography

Camera, F., “Vivere come l’altro dell’altro”. Appunti per una logica relazionale dell’alterità. In Pirni, A. (a cura di), Logiche dell’alterità. Edizioni ETS (2009), pp. 43-58.

Irigaray, L. Guynn, N., “The question of the other”. Yale French Studies, n°87, Another Look, Another Women: Retraslation of French Feminism (1995), pp.7-19.

Wimmer, F.M., Czajka, A., “Gli altri sono esseri pensanti come noi”. Inizi, tappe, problemi e compiti della filosofia interculturale. In Pirni, A. (a cura di), Logiche dell’alterità. Edizioni ETS (2009), pp. 173-186.

Negotiated Governance: Passing the Puck

An interesting short article ...

 http://www.horizons.gc.ca/eng/content/negotiated-governance-passing-puck

Author (s): Teresa Bellefontaine, Policy Horizons Canada

Document Type: Policy Insight

Published Date: 2012-06

ISBN number: PH4-117/2012E-PDF   978-1-100-20874-9

As governments and the societies they serve continue to cope with complex challenges and economic uncertainty, "negotiated governance" is gaining renewed traction as one way to liberate innovation. Networked governance, collaborative governance and co-creation all describe similar policy approaches – those that aim to maximize society's ability to address common problems using shared discretion. This trend is not new, but it is increasingly seen as a legitimate approach by policy makers. Examples abound, but do we understand the strengths and challenges of this approach?

The Game is Changing

Negotiated governance takes many forms and the level of decision-making authority varies, as do the governance arrangements, the partners and the goals. Governments may or may not initiate them, and may be a senior or junior partner; but commonly a non-governmental party directly provides services and innovation. Government has only indirect influence and - when they are involved at all – it must enter into a relationship based on negotiation rather than control. The imperative for efficiency has been one driver for governments behind this shift to negotiated governance. Other drivers include changing demographics, public expectations for greater engagement, new technology, a changing political environment due to globalization, and complex issues and challenges.

Under Salamon's "indirect" New Governance Paradigm (see table 1) the shift toward shared discretion has implications for the type of governance structure (networks), the actors (both public and private), the leverage points for government (negotiation and persuasion), and the types of skills required in the public service (enablement skills). Lester Salamon has argued that the shift toward networks calls for a focus on policy tools, rather than agencies or programs, as it is the tool that forms the nature of the network and the roles of the actors in it.

Table 1: Salamon's New Governance Paradigm
Classical Public Administration	New Governance
Program/agency	Tool
Hierarchy	Network
Public vs. private	Public + private
Command and control	Negotiation and persuasion
Management skills	Enablement skills

Source: Salamon, 2002

For Salamon, the ability of the public service to implement and manage network processes is another important aspect of different models of negotiated governance, based on whether new structures need to be built. Additional challenges include the capacity for long-term planning, new forms of accountability, and enhanced public sector skills sets. These include enablement skills to activate and coordinate networks of actors without controlling them, and negotiation skills to find common ground amongst partners and modulate incentives. In particular the administrative needs of networks are argued to not be aligned with public sector strengths such as hierarchical traditions and a rules-based culture.

Negotiated Governance in Practice

The trend toward collaboration can be observed even within seemingly traditional arrangements. For instance, contracts are a form of negotiated governance in that private contractors are used to deliver an outcome, and the offered contract terms must be favourable enough to attract competition. More recently, policy observers point to more collaborative approaches to contracting, where more autonomy is given in how the contract achieves desired objectives (Donahue and Zeckhauser, 2011, p. 69).

On the other end of the spectrum, Action for Neighborhood Change (ANC) is a Canadian example where five federal agencies, three non-profit organizations and local communities engaged in a partnership to revitalize neighbourhoods. Significant discretion rested in the hands of each community to determine their needs, develop intended outcomes of the project, as well as the strategies to achieve them. According to Neil Bradford, there were several lessons to be learned from this program. ANC is seen as a notable innovation in Canada from the public sector perspective. The multiple partners were able to negotiate a single federal contribution agreement and one evaluation framework – a feat that was described as a “miracle” (Bradford & Chouinard, 2010, p. 63). The multiple accountabilities were accommodated by focusing on process outcomes such as relationship building and capacity building within the evaluation framework. However, Bradford points out that both the short-term evaluation requirements and a lack of federal horizontal integration were considered barriers to the project’s innovation and achievement of longer-term results. This project highlights the challenges with existing governance structures and accountability requirements for collaborative policy approaches.

Co-creation and co-production of public services is another way innovation is being pursued. New Synthesis argues that the users of services are an untapped source of public value, and that by shifting decision-making away from traditional contracts and direct public service delivery to more reciprocal processes, people can improve both the development of services and their delivery. A case in point is Denmark's MindLab, which used co-creation to improve young people's interaction with the public sector in its Away with the Red Tape initiative. Ethnography, including home visits, provided a better understanding of citizens to create user-centred design. The project identified several areas for improvement including the importance of:

• users knowing how their case will be dealt with;
• creating self-reliance by improving on-line processes;
• investing early on in personal contact including face to face meetings; and
• building horizontal alliances to ensure positive interactions throughout the system.

Radical Efficiency is a similar approach in the United Kingdom that pursues “better services for less” by making the improvement of people’s lives the goal for public sector reform and empowering people at the local level to achieve these results. This effectively puts the search for cost-savings on its head, placing the emphasis not on efficiency, but rather empathy and innovation as the way to discover new insights, new customers, new suppliers, and new resources in the delivery of public services. This approach has delivered cost-savings of twenty to sixty percent according to Nesta, and enables government to manage four bottom lines: productivity, service experience, results, and democracy.

Where governments initiate projects, shared discretion can be seen as a trade-off: direct control and the power to enforce government goals are traded for the ability to draw in the capacity of other actors within a negotiated relationship. In the context of networks, Eva Sorensen and Jacob Torfing describe this as meta-governance, or the “governance of relatively self-governing networks”. These are networks that operate within limits, using on-going dialogue to develop norms and approaches, rather than the more traditional use of legal sanctions or the fear of economic loss to impose a hierarchical interpretation of policy objectives. This approach, can widen available resources, free innovative thinking, build consensus and create alternate forms of legitimacy.  It may not necessarily translate into over-all cost savings and in some cases has cost more, as was the case in Chicago’s Millenium Park, due to the creation of a broader public vision. This example also demonstrates that partners are more likely to become involved if they have input into how a project will be developed and if they know they are creating something above and beyond what government could have achieved through taxation alone.

Being a Team Player

Negotiated governance is best used when a joint public and private approach can deliver better outcomes, increased public value or productivity. However, it is about more than outcomes; it is also seen as a way to increase the authenticity of inputs, including participation, democratic values and accountability (Sorensen & Torfing, 2010, p. 306). The cases reviewed here merely indicate the wider experimentation that is providing a rich source of learning, and point to opportunities, risks and needed skills development within government, the private sector and civil society. Whether it is discussed in terms of "indirect government", "meta-governance" or "co-creation", negotiated governance is about recognizing the strengths and weaknesses of diverse players in our society and learning to work together as a team.

Sources

Bason, Christian. 2010. Leading Public Sector Innovation: Co-creating for a Better Society. Bristol: The Policy Press.

Bradford, Neil and Jill Anne Chouinard. 2010. “Learning Through Evaluation? Reflections on Two Federal Community-Building Initiatives”. The Canadian Journal of Program Evaluation. Vol. 24 No. 1: 51-77.

Bourgon, Jocelyne. 2011. A New Synthesis of Public Administration: Serving in the 21st Century. Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen’s University Press, Queen's Policy Studies Series, 2011.

Donahue, John D. and Richard J. Zeckhauser. 2011. Collaborative Governance: Private Roles for Public Goals in Turbulent Times. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Gillinson, Sarah, Matthew Horne and Peter Baeck. 2010. “Radical Efficiency: Different, better lower cost public services”. NESTA: London.

Salamon, Lester M. 2002. The Tools of Government: A guide to the New Governance.  New York: Oxford University Press.

Sorensen, Eva and Jacob Torfing, Jacob (Eds). 2007. Theories of Democratic Network Governance. London: Palgrave McMillan.

Torfing, Jacob. 2011. “Collaborative Innovation in the Public Sector and the Role of Metagovernance” presentation, Policy Horizons Canada, May 19, 2011.

FAO ecosystem approach to fisheries management

http://www.fao.org/fishery/topic/13261/en

Principles of ecosystem approaches to fisheries 

 The FAO Technical Guidelines on the ecosystem approach to fisheries (FAO 2003) define EAF as follows:

"An ecosystem approach to fisheries strives to balance diverse societal objectives, by taking into account the knowledge and uncertainties about biotic, abiotic and human components of ecosystems and their interactions and applying an integrated approach to fisheries within ecologically meaningful boundaries."

[...]  the following elements emerge as the foundations and components of an ecosystem management approach to fisheries and aquaculture:

• Recognize that management objectives are a matter of societal choice.  
• Decentralize decision and action to the lowest appropriate level, while recognising that there must also be mechanisms to ensure that management decisions and actions are consistent and coordinated at the higher levels required
• Introduce measures to ensure transparency, public awareness and consensus building
• Establish effective conflict resolution and enforcement mechanisms.
• Ensure coordination, consultation and cooperation, including joint decision-making,
• Recognize and identify the various direct and indirect uses and users of the ecosystem and involve all stakeholders in knowledge-sharing, decision-making and management.
• Translate the high-level policy goals for EAF into transparent and comprehensive operational objectives
•  Governance for EAF should ensure both human and ecosystem well-being and equitable allocation of benefits, as a condition for compliance

Ecosystem approach to fisheries: a review of implementation guidelines

1. Serge M. Garcia∗ and
2. Kevern L. Cochrane  

http://icesjms.oxfordjournals.org/content/62/3/311.full

Abstract

The FAO and other guidelines available for the implementation of the ecosystem approach to fisheries are briefly reviewed. The paper recalls the high-level policy foundations and the main issues, related to fisheries and non-fishing impacts as well as to natural variability. It reviews the central paradigm and the extension of the conventional management required to better account for ecosystem considerations. It focuses on the policy, strategy development, and implementation processes required to adapt the fuzzy principles and conceptual goals to the reality of specific situations, addressing briefly the central issues of capacity-building, management costs, realistic time frames, and the role of science, and concludes with comments on the respective roles of the various types of stakeholders. 

read the article at the indicated web page...

The good-governance trap

FAO experts Jomo Kwame Sundaram and Michael T Clark question whether government reforms really lead to more rapid and inclusive development. 

 http://www.eco-business.com/opinion/the-good-governance-trap/

Development and improved governance have tended to go hand in hand. But, contrary to popular belief, there is little evidence that success in implementing governance reforms leads to more rapid and inclusive economic and social development. In fact, it may be the other way around.
The focus on good governance stems from the struggle to restore sustained growth during the developing-country debt crises of the 1980s. Instead of reassessing the prevailing economic-policy approach, international development institutions took aim at the easy targets: developing-country governments. Advising those governments on how to do their jobs became a new vocation for these institutions, which quickly developed new “technical” approaches to governance reform.
The World Bank, using well over 100 indicators, introduced a composite index of good governance, based on perceptions of voice and accountability, political stability and the absence of violence, government effectiveness, regulatory quality, the rule of law, and levels of corruption. By claiming that it had found a strong correlation between its governance indicators and economic performance, the Bank fueled hope that the key to economic progress had been found.
The case was flawed from the beginning. The indicators used were ahistorical and failed to account for country-specific challenges and conditions, with cross-country statistical analyses suffering from selection bias and ignoring the interlinkages among a wide array of variables. As a result, the World Bank badly overestimated the impact of governance reform on economic growth.
To be sure, governance that is effective, legitimate, and responsive provides untold benefits, especially when compared to the alternative: inefficient governance, cronyism, and corruption. But the focus on governance reform has not proved nearly as effective as promised in fostering development.
In fact, this governance-focused approach may have actually undermined development efforts. For starters, it has allowed international institutions to avoid acknowledging the shortcomings of the new development orthodoxy of the last two decades of the twentieth century, when Latin America lost over a decade, and Sub-Saharan Africa a quarter-century, of economic and social progress.
It has also complicated the work of governments unnecessarily. With good-governance reforms now a condition for international aid, developing-country governments often end up mimicking donor expectations, instead of addressing the issues that are most pressing for their own citizens. Indeed, such reforms can even undermine traditional rights and customary obligations worked out among communities over many generations.
Moreover, the required reforms are so wide-ranging that they are beyond the means of most developing countries to implement. As a result, good-governance solutions tend to distract from more effective development efforts.
Another problem with governance reforms is that, although they are formally neutral, they often favor particular vested interests, with grossly unfair consequences. Reforms aimed at decentralization and devolution have, in some cases, enabled the rise of powerful local political patrons.

The conclusion is clear: the development agenda should not be overloaded with governance reform. As Harvard’s Merilee Grindle has put it, we should be aiming for “good enough” governance, selecting a few imperatives from a long list of possibilities.
But selecting the most important measures will not be easy. Indeed, advocates of governance reform have rarely been right about the most effective approach.
Consider the unrelenting promotion of efforts to strengthen property rights. Absent alienable individual ownership of productive resources, it is asserted, there will be insufficient means and incentives to pursue development initiatives, and shared resources (the “commons”) will be over-exploited and used inefficiently.
In reality, the so-called “tragedy of the commons” is neither ubiquitous nor inevitable, and individual property rights are not always the best – and never the only – institutional solution for dealing with social dilemmas. The late Elinor Ostrom, a Nobel laureate in economics, showed that human societies have built myriad creative and lasting solutions to resolve a wide range of dilemmas involving the use of common resources.
The theme of good governance has special appeal to large bureaucratic organizations like multilateral development banks and UN agencies, which favor apolitical solutions to what are essentially political problems. In other words, good governance is an ostensibly technocratic answer to what donors and other well-meaning international groups consider bad policies and, especially, bad politics.
Herein lies the real problem with the good-governance agenda: it supposes that the solution to most policy and political dilemmas lies in compliance with a set of formal process-oriented indicators. But experience over two decades shows that such directives provide little practical guidance for solving the technically, socially, and politically complex real-world problems of economic development.
Recognizing that governance improves with development, the international community would be better served by pursuing reforms that directly advance development, instead of a broad agenda that may have, at best, a small indirect impact. Such a pragmatic approach to improving governance would be neither dogmatic nor pretend to universality. Instead, the major constraints would be identified, analyzed, and addressed, perhaps sequentially.
Many of the good-governance agenda’s key goals – empowerment, inclusion, participation, integrity, transparency, and accountability – can be built into workable solutions, not because outsiders demand them, but because effective solutions require them. Such solutions should draw from relevant experiences, with the understanding that they do not amount to “best practices.”
The blind pursuit of good governance has guided development efforts for too long. It is time to acknowledge what works – and disregard what does not.

 

Le leurre de la bonne gouvernance

http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/governance-reform-development-agenda-by-jomo-kwame-sundaram-and-michael-t--clark-2015-06/french

ROME – Le développement économique et une gouvernance améliorée viennent souvent de pair. Pourtant, contrairement à la croyance générale, il y a peu d’indications que le succès de la mise en vigueur des réformes de gouvernance entraîne un développement économique et social accéléré et inclusif. En fait, il est fort probable que ce soit l’inverse.

L’intérêt porté aux pratiques de bonne gouvernance découle des difficultés rencontrées pour relancer la croissance durable lors des crises de la dette des pays en développement au cours des années 1980. Au lieu de revoir l’orientation des politiques économiques, les institutions internationales de développement s’en sont prises à des proies faciles : les gouvernements des pays en développement. Ces institutions se sont donné pour mission de conseiller les instances de ces pays sur leurs façons de faire, qui s’est vite transformée dans de nouvelles approches « techniques » en matière de réforme de la gouvernance.

La Banque mondiale, s’appuyant sur plus de 100 indicateurs, a formulé un indice composé pour jauger le degré de bonne gouvernance, sur la base des perceptions du droit au chapitre des citoyens, de l’imputabilité, de la stabilité politique, de l’absence de violence, de l’efficacité du secteur public, de la qualité du cadre réglementaire, de l’État de droit et du degré de corruption. En avançant avoir décelé une forte corrélation entre ses indices de gouvernance et les résultats économiques, la Banque a entretenu les espoirs que le secret du progrès économique avait enfin été découvert.

Le dossier était sur des assises très fragiles dès le début. Les indices dont les analystes de la Banque se sont servis ne tenaient pas compte des facteurs d’historicité ni des défis et conditions propres à chaque pays, car les analyses statistiques comparatives des pays comportaient des biais de sélection et passaient sous silence les liens d’interdépendance d’une vaste gamme de variables. En conséquence, la Banque mondiale a largement surestimé les répercussions des réformes en matière de gouvernance sur la croissance économique.

Il est vrai que des pratiques de gouvernance effectives, légitimes et adaptées présentent d’innombrables avantages, surtout lorsque comparées aux autres choix : des pratiques inefficaces de gouvernance, le népotisme et la corruption. Mais l’accent mis sur la gouvernance ne s’est pas avérée aussi efficace que promise pour ce qui est de favoriser le développement.

En fait, ces politiques axées sur la gouvernance ont probablement entravé certaines initiatives de développement. En premier lieu, elles ont permis aux institutions internationales d’éviter de reconnaître les lacunes de la nouvelle orthodoxie du développement des deux dernières décennies du XX^e siècle, alors que l’Amérique latine perdait une décennie complète et l’Afrique subsaharienne un quart de siècle, sur le plan des progrès économiques et sociaux.

Elles ont inutilement compliqué la tâche des États. Puisque les réformes pour améliorer la gouvernance sont désormais une condition pour obtenir de l’aide internationale, les autorités des pays en développement finissent toujours par reproduire les structures auxquelles s’attendent les bailleurs de fonds, au lieu de s’attaquer aux problèmes les plus pressants de leurs propres citoyens. En fait, ces réformes peuvent même ébranler les droits traditionnels et les obligations de droit coutumier ciselés par les collectivités au fil des générations.

De plus, les réformes requises sont de si grande envergure que les pays en développement n’ont pas les moyens de les appliquer. En conséquence, les solutions visant la bonne gouvernance ont tendance à les détourner des initiatives de développement les plus porteuses.

Un autre problème des réformes de gouvernance réside dans le fait que même si elles sont formellement neutres, elles favorisent souvent des intérêts en place, avec des conséquences plutôt injustes. Les réformes visant la décentralisation et le transfert des pouvoirs ont, dans certains cas, facilité la montée au pouvoir dans ces pays d’une clique puissante de protecteurs politiques.

La conclusion est évidente : il ne faut pas imposer un fardeau exagéré aux programmes de développement par des réformes de gouvernance. Selon Merilee Grindle, de l’Université de Harvard, nous devrions viser des pratiques de gouvernance modérées, en sélectionnant quelques principes dans une longue liste de possibilités.

Le choix des mesures les plus importantes sera certainement ardu. Même les défenseurs des réformes de gouvernance ont rarement visé juste en ce qui a trait aux meilleures stratégies en cette matière.

Penchons-nous sur le fait que l’on ne cesse jamais de promouvoir les initiatives de renforcement du droit de propriété. On fait valoir que sans droit transmissible de propriété individuelle sur des ressources productives, les moyens et les incitatifs manquent à l’appel lorsqu’il s’agit de poursuivre les initiatives de développement. Sans compter que les ressources à propriété commune (le « patrimoine collectif ») feront l’objet d’une surexploitation et d’une utilisation inefficace.

En réalité, ladite « tragédie des biens communs » n’est pas si répandue et elle n’est pas inéluctable, car le droit à la propriété individuelle n’est pas toujours la meilleure ni la seule solution institutionnelle pour régler des problèmes sociaux. La regrettée lauréate du prix Nobel en économie Elinor Ostrom, a démontré que les sociétés humaines ont su créer une myriade de solutions créatives et durables pour résoudre un vaste éventail de problèmes liés à l’exploitation de ressources à propriété commune.

Le thème de la bonne gouvernance a un attrait particulier pour les grands organismes bureaucratiques comme des banques de développement multilatérales et les agences de l’ONU, qui favorisent des solutions apolitiques à des problèmes essentiellement politiques. Autrement dit, la bonne gouvernance est une réplique technocratique bien en vue à ce que les bailleurs et d’autres groupes internationaux bien intentionnés considèrent comme de mauvaises politiques et, surtout, de la petite politique.

C’est à cette enseigne que loge le vrai problème des réformes de bonne gouvernance : elles présument que la solution à la plupart des problèmes d’interventions publiques et des problèmes d’ordre politique repose sur la conformité avec un éventail d’indices officiels axés sur les processus. Mais l’expérience de deux décennies montre que de telles directives offrent peu de conseils pratiques pour régler de vrais problèmes de développement économique qui demeurent techniquement, socialement et politiquement très complexes.

En admettant que la gouvernance s’améliore avec le développement, la communauté internationale aurait été mieux servie en poursuivant des réformes qui le font avancer directement, au lieu d’un vaste programme de réformes qui aurait, au mieux, de faibles incidences indirectes. Une telle démarche pragmatique à l’amélioration de la gouvernance n’a rien de dogmatique et elle ne prétendrait pas être une panacée. Les principales contraintes seraient plutôt définies, analysées et résolues, probablement en séquence.

Bon nombre des grands objectifs des réformes qui visent la bonne gouvernance – l’autonomie, l’inclusion, la participation, l’intégrité, la transparence et l’imputabilité – peuvent être incorporés à des solutions pratiques, non pas parce que des personnes de l’extérieur les réclament, mais parce que les solutions doivent y recourir pour être efficaces. Il faut que de telles solutions s’inspirent de cas d’expérience pertinents, étant entendu qu’elles ne constituent pas l’idéal des « pratiques exemplaires ».

La poursuite aveugle de la bonne gouvernance a guidé les initiatives de développement depuis beaucoup trop longtemps. Il est temps de reconnaître ce qui fonctionne – et de faire fi de ce qui ne marche pas.

Traduit de l’anglais par Pierre Castegnier

Read more at http://www.project-syndicate.org/commentary/governance-reform-development-agenda-by-jomo-kwame-sundaram-and-michael-t--clark-2015-06/french#K7A361KjZhx2p6J8.99